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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, federal and state governments have enacted various 
forms of legislation aimed at protecting women and children from 
domestic abuse.1 Though incidents of domestic violence have declined 
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law, 2018. The author would like to thank her
family for their patience and support, as well as everyone at The University of Akron School of Law 
who devoted their time and assistance during the writing process. 
1. See, e.g., Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (2017);
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over the past two decades, there are still millions of new cases arising each 
year.2 Accordingly, despite these legislative efforts, domestic violence 
remains a serious problem in the United States. Some have argued that 
laws targeting domestic abuse lack efficiency because victims often do 
not report domestic assaults,3 and when they do, there is inconsistent 
application of the laws from state to state. 
One such law is the Lautenberg Amendment, which was enacted in 
1996 with the intention of imposing a lifetime ban on firearms possession 
for those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.4 Since 
the Amendment was ratified, the courts have struggled to make sense of 
its various ambiguous terms.5 Further, courts have continued to broaden 
the scope of the Amendment, as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Voisine v. United States, and have now extended its reach into 
potentially unconstitutional territory.6 
This Comment focuses primarily on the Court’s broad extension of 
the Lautenberg Amendment, and further argues that the decision in 
Voisine fails to promote a compelling government interest. In cases of 
knowing or intentional domestic violence, it makes sense to keep 
convicted abusers from possessing guns; not only is the abuser’s behavior 
inherently violent, but sometimes, the only thing that prevents abuse from 
Violence Against Women Act (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701 through 14040); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (LEXIS through HB 59 (excluding HB 49)).  
2. See Melissa Jeltsen, This is How a Domestic Violence Victim Falls Through the Cracks, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/16/domestic-
violence_n_5474177.html [http://perma.cc/LG8H-3MBT] (“Domestic violence has been on a steady 
decline in the U.S. for the past 20 years. Since the landmark Violence Against Women Act was passed 
in 1994, annual rates of domestic violence have plummeted by 64 percent. But the U.S. still has the 
highest rate of domestic violence homicide of any industrialized country.”); Shannan M. Catalano, 
Ph.D., Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2010, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Nov. 16, 2012), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4536 [http://perma.cc/F4R3-W3JV]; see also 
National Statistics Domestic Violence Fact Sheet, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://ncadv.org/assets/2497/domestic_violence.pdf [http://perma.cc/2N3D-Y5A4] (last visited June 
13, 2017) (“In the United States, an average of 20 people are physically abused by intimate partners 
every minute. This equates to more than 10 million abuse victims annually.”). 
3. See Domestic Violence Facts, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., http://www.feminist.org/
other/dv/dvfact.html [http://perma.cc/NUK2-QF3R] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (“Only about half of 
domestic violence incidents are reported to police.”). 
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate 
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition which has 
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 
12 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014); Voisine v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 2272 (2016). 
6. See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2291 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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turning into murder is the presence of a gun.7 However, extending the 
reach of the Lautenberg Amendment to reckless misdemeanants would 
not have the same effect, as many acts committed recklessly may be 
accidental, or at the very least, are not inherently violent.8 
Yet, the Court found in Voisine that the language of the Lautenberg 
Amendment should extend to reckless misdemeanants and impose upon 
them a lifetime ban on firearms possession.9 The Court reasoned that the 
inclusion of reckless misdemeanants would help close a “dangerous 
loophole” in gun control laws.10 The overall impact on gun-related 
domestic violence will be minimal, though, because current laws do not 
prohibit many other groups, such as those convicted of domestic violence 
against a current or former dating partner, those convicted of stalking, or 
those under a temporary restraining order, from possessing firearms.11 
Because those groups of individuals are more likely to be dangerous and 
pose a significantly greater threat of harm than reckless misdemeanants, 
the decision in Voisine creates an uneven policy which will do little, if 
anything, to help the actual victims of dangerous domestic abuse. More 
importantly, the Voisine decision strips these individuals of protections 
afforded to them by the United States Constitution. 
To fully appreciate the implications of the Court’s decision regarding 
Second Amendment rights and its misapplication of the term 
“recklessness,” it is important to first understand the significant legislative 
decisions leading up to Voisine. Therefore, Section II of this Comment 
looks at the history and political atmosphere at the time the Lautenberg 
Amendment was enacted to better explain the aim of the legislation. 
Section III takes an in-depth look at Voisine itself, discussing the 
history of the case, the procedural posture, and the majority’s analysis. A 
detailed evaluation of the dissenting opinion follows, explaining the 
pitfalls and constitutional implications of the majority’s decision, with 
7. See, e.g., Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1408-09 (“[T]he presence of a firearm increases the
likelihood that it will escalate to homicide.” (internal citations omitted)); National Statistics Domestic 
Violence Fact Sheet, supra note 2 (“The presence of a gun in a domestic violence situation increases 
the risk of homicide by 500%.” (internal citations omitted)).  
8. See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2287-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that the term “use 
of physical force” should “not include nonviolent, reckless acts that cause physical injury or an 
offensive touching,” because not all reckless acts have the requisite mens rea to make them volitional, 
and in some instances, reckless actions may be merely accidental). 
9. Id. at 2282. 
10. Id. at 2274 (internal citations omitted).
11. See Guns and Domestic Violence, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/assets/2497/guns_and_dv.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LAU-8FFY] (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016). 
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particular attention given to Justice Thomas’ Second Amendment 
concerns. 
Section IV discusses various courts’ interpretations of the 
Lautenberg Amendment, up to and including the decision in Voisine, and 
further highlights the inconsistencies between the courts’ application of 
the law and the legislative intent of Congress. This Section includes a 
detailed analysis of the recklessness standard, showing how it has been 
applied by other courts in similar situations, and how the application in 
Voisine is inconsistent with the jurisprudence from virtually all courts 
outside of the First Circuit. This Section examines various policy 
implications as well. 
Section V looks specifically at the Second Amendment, and how the 
ruling in Voisine thrusts the Lautenberg Amendment into unconstitutional 
territory. In short, the majority’s decision strips individuals of a 
fundamental constitutional right based upon an arbitrary application of the 
phrase “use of physical force.” This meritless denial of a constitutional 
protection is unparalleled, unwarranted, and sets a dangerously low 
threshold for denying further constitutional protections in the future. 
Because the courts, including the Supreme Court, continue to move 
further and further from applying the Lautenberg Amendment to the 
intended class of individuals, this constitutional injustice is unlikely to be 
corrected jurisprudentially. To alleviate this unfairness and truly help 
domestic abuse victims, Congress should revise the terminology of the 
Lautenberg Amendment to specifically target dangerous individuals that 
are likely to commit subsequent acts of firearms violence. By doing so, 
Congress can spell out the precise standards of inclusion, and thus provide 
a more consistent, constitutional application of the law. 
II. FIREARMS LEGISLATION LIMITING SECOND AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS 
From the time the Second Amendment was adopted, there has been 
considerable debate regarding the intended meaning of the phrase “the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms.”12 The Supreme Court has 
grappled with this language for more than two centuries, offering many 
12. See Second Amendment, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/second_amendment [http://perma.cc/NZ7N-A223] (“Such 
language has created considerable debate regarding the Amendment’s intended scope. On the one 
hand, some believe that the Amendment’s phrase ‘the right of the people to keep and bear Arms’ 
creates an individual constitutional right for citizens of the United States . . . . On the other hand, some 
scholars point to the prefatory language ‘a well-regulated Militia’ to argue that the Framers intended 
only to restrict Congress from legislating away a state’s right to self-defense.”).  
4
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theories on how best to interpret the breadth of the Second Amendment.13 
In 2008, the Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right, and not merely a collective right, 
to possess and use firearms for traditionally lawful purposes such as self-
defense.14 Shortly thereafter, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court 
declared the Second Amendment a fundamental right that extended to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.15 
However, because the Second Amendment is not considered to be an 
“absolute right,”16 Congress has also enacted numerous statutes placing 
restrictions on firearms possession in an attempt to better ensure the safety 
of the American people.17 One of the earliest statutes enacted by Congress 
was the 1968 Gun Control Act, which regulated interstate commerce of 
firearms by establishing numerous licensing regulations and determining 
who would be prohibited from owning firearms.18 
The 1968 Gun Control Act delegated enforcement responsibilities to 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).19 In 
1982, after allegations of abuse by the ATF were raised, a Senate 
subcommittee released a report calling for reform of federal firearm laws, 
suggesting that the ATF’s application of the Act may have been 
encroaching on Second Amendment protections.20 The report indicated 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) (“The Constitution was
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary 
as distinguished from technical meaning . . . .” (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“‘[T]he people’ seems to have been a term of art 
employed in select parts of the Constitution . . . [the way it is used] suggest[s] that ‘the people’ 
protected by the . . . Second Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community.”). 
14. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (“Putting all of these textual
elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons . . . . 
This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment.”). 
15. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010) (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”). 
16. Heller, 561 U.S. at 681 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he protection the Amendment
provides is not absolute. The Amendment permits government to regulate the interests that it 
serves.”). 
17. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (prohibiting the transfer of
firearms to certain classes of persons); Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 
100 Stat. 449 (limiting restrictions on firearms ownership); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103–159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (requiring background checks on certain firearm 
purchasers).  
18. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 § 922. 
19. Id. at § 178.11. 
20. See REPORT OF THE S. COMM. ON THE CONST. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH 
CONG., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982) (“The conclusion is thus 
inescapable that the history, concept, and wording of the second amendment to the Constitution of 
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that up to 75% of prosecutions under the 1968 Gun Control Act “were 
aimed at ordinary citizens who had neither criminal intent nor knowledge, 
but were enticed by agents into unknowing technical violations,” and that 
reform “would enhance vital protection of constitutional and civil liberties 
of those Americans who choose to exercise their Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms.”21 Responding to these concerns, Congress 
enacted The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 to better ensure that 
the ATF properly enforced the firearms restrictions.22 
As the debate over Second Amendment limitations continued 
through the 1980s, domestic abuse crimes also started to gain attention.23 
Until the late 1970s, incidents of domestic violence were widely 
considered to be private matters.24 However, as domestic violence 
awareness became more prevalent over the next two decades, Congress 
responded by enacting federal legislation aimed at protecting battered and 
abused women.25 
The Violence Against Women Act, enacted in 1994, was a 
significant piece of legislation that focused on the shortfalls of the justice 
system in prosecuting violent crimes against women.26 In the wake of the 
Violence Against Women Act, Congress expressed concern that existing 
federal gun laws were only aimed at felons convicted of domestic violence 
crimes, though many domestic violence acts were, in reality, prosecuted 
as misdemeanors.27 Thus, Congress enacted the Lautenberg Amendment 
the United States, as well as its interpretation by every major commentator and court in the first half-
century after its ratification, indicates that what is protected is an individual right of a private citizen 
to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner.”). 
21. Id.
22. See Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449. 
23. See Domestic Violence: History of Police Responses, FINDLAW (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://family.findlaw.com/domestic-violence/domestic-violence-history-of-police-responses.html 
[http://perma.cc/WFM6-SJQE] (“Domestic violence became an increasingly popular issue in the 
1970s and 1980s. As awareness for violence between intimate partners grew, so did criticism on the 
manner in which police were responding to the issue.”).  
24. See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE & SOCIAL CHANGE
160 (New York, Routledge 1992) (“The CJS [Criminal Justice System] was not considered the 
appropriate institution for dealing with violence against women within the home; it was . . . defined 
as a family and personal problem best dealt with through social and psychological solutions.”). 
25. See, e.g., Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13925 (2017); Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified in 
part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701 through 14040). 
26. Violence Against Women Act (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701 through 14040). 
27. See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (“Existing felon-in-possession laws,
Congress recognized, were not keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers, because ‘many 
people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of 
felonies.’ By extending the federal firearm prohibition to persons convicted of ‘misdemeanor crime[s] 
of domestic violence,’ proponents of § 922(g)(9) sought to ‘close this dangerous loophole.’” (internal 
6
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in 1996, later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which extended the 
federal prohibition on firearms possession enumerated in the Gun Control 
Act to include individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic 
violence under state law.28 Section 921(a)(33)(A) of the Amendment 
defines the phrase “domestic violence misdemeanor crime” to include 
“any misdemeanor under federal, state or tribal law that was committed 
against a domestic relation that involves the ‘use . . . of physical force.’”29 
Unfortunately, since the Lautenberg Amendment’s enactment, the 
Supreme Court has struggled to interpret its various terms, including 
“use,” “physical force,” and “domestic violence,” to ensure correct and 
consistent application.30 The Court initially eliminated much of this 
confusion in United States v. Castleman, holding that “a knowing or 
intentional assault qualifies as such a crime,”31 though most minor 
applications of force would not be considered “violent.”32 This conclusion 
did not, however, determine if the same was true for reckless assaults.33 
The Supreme Court was tasked with that decision in 2016, when two 
petitioners alleged that convictions of domestic assault, which may have 
been considered reckless, should not result in a lifetime firearm ban. Up 
until that point, the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of 
citations omitted)). 
28. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2017). 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (2017) (“(a) As used in this chapter—(1) The term ‘person’ and 
the term ‘whoever’ include any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, 
society, or joint stock company. (33)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term 
‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ means an offense that—(i) is a misdemeanor under 
Federal, State, or Tribal law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or 
the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian 
of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is 
cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person 
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”). 
30. See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (finding that the phrase “crime of
violence” included “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” and that the phrase “use 
of force” excluded accidents); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (finding that the 
phrase “physical force” meant violent force); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1409 (2014) 
(holding that knowing or intentional assault qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 
but did not determine whether “reckless” acts would fall under that category). 
31. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2274 (2016) (holding that the defendant’s 
conviction for having “intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to” the mother of his child 
qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” (internal citations omitted)). 
32. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“Minor uses of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in the
generic sense. For example, in an opinion that we cited with approval in Johnson, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that it was ‘hard to describe . . . as “violence” ‘a squeeze of the arm [that] causes a bruise.’” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
33. Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2274 (stating that in Castleman, the Court held that a knowing or
intentional assault qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, but did not determine 
whether the same was true of a reckless assault). 
7
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whether a reckless application of force would constitute a “use of force,” 
though the circuit courts, with the exception of the First Circuit, had 
uniformly held that mere reckless conduct was not sufficient to be 
considered a crime of violence.34 
III. VOISINE V. UNITED STATES
A. Background and Procedural Posture 
In 2004, Stephen Voisine was convicted of violating § 207 of the 
Maine Criminal Code for “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing 
bodily injury or offensive physical touching” to his girlfriend when he 
slapped her on the cheek.35 While being investigated during a later 
incident involving the death of a bald eagle, law enforcement discovered 
that Voisine owned a hunting rifle and charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after previously being convicted of a 
misdemeanor domestic assault.36 Voisine claimed, among other things, 
that his actions could have been considered reckless, and that prohibiting 
him from possessing a gun infringed on his Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms. The district court convicted Voisine and the First 
Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that in passing the Lautenberg 
Amendment, Congress “recognized that guns and domestic violence are a 
lethal combination and singled out firearm possession by those convicted 
of domestic violence offenses from firearm possession in other 
contexts.”37 
34. E.g., Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414 n.8; United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1335-36 
(11th Cir. 2010); Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Torres-Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, 
615-16 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Portela, 469 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2006); Fernandez-Ruiz 
v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1127-32 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Garcia v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 465,
468-69 (4th Cir. 2006); Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 263-65 (3d Cir. 2005); Jobson v. 
Ashcroft, 326 F.3d 367, 373 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 926 (5th 
Cir. 2001). But see United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2011). 
35. Supreme Court Upholds Reach of Gun Ban for Domestic Violence, CBS NEWS, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-upholds-reach-of-gun-ban-for-domestic-violence/ 
[http://perma.cc/LM84-S5WC] (last visited June 13, 2017). 
36. United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 2015). 
37. United States v. Voisine, No. 1:11-cr-00017-JAW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40931, at *2
(D. Me. Apr. 14, 2011); Voisine, 778 F.3d at 187. The Court considered the exact issues raised by 
Voisine in denying a motion to dismiss in a separate matter. United States v. Bryant, 1:11-cr-00021-
JAW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39809 (N.D. Cal Jan. 7, 2011). In Bryant, the First Circuit upheld an 
earlier decision that “all convictions under [17-A M.R.S. § 207] qualify as misdemeanor crimes of 
domestic violence within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9),” and held that it remained “the law 
in this Circuit and binding on this Court.” Bryant, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39809.  
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss1/5
2017] THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT 197 
In 2008, William Armstrong was convicted of a misdemeanor 
assault, in violation of § 207, after he and his wife got into a shoving match 
while baking cookies.38 In May 2010, during a search of his residence in 
suspicion of alleged drug possession, law enforcement discovered that 
Armstrong owned six guns.39 Because the guns were not within the scope 
of the warrant, the police contacted the ATF and alerted them that 
Armstrong had firearms at his residence.40 Officers also notified 
Armstrong that he could not have firearms in his home, and in response, 
Armstrong’s wife called a family friend, who removed the firearms from 
the premises.41 
On May 19, 2010, the ATF executed a federal warrant to search 
Armstrong’s home, and though the officers did not find any firearms, they 
recovered over 1,300 rounds of ammunition.42 Based on this finding, 
Armstrong was arrested, charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), 
and was convicted.43 Like Voisine, he too argued that his actions may 
have been reckless and that the Lautenberg Amendment’s application 
infringed on his Second Amendment rights.44 The First Circuit, relying on 
its previous reasoning in United States v. Booker, found that in enacting 
the Lautenberg Amendment, Congress was concerned with the link 
between “the presence of a gun in the home of a convicted domestic 
abuser with increased risk of homicide,” and that those concerns 
constituted an important government interest that justified the restraint on 
Armstrong’s constitutional rights.45 
Voisine and Armstrong filed a joint petition for certiorari, and in the 
wake of Castleman, which held that knowing and intentional conduct 
constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9), 
the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the First Circuit for further 
consideration.46 On remand, the First Circuit found differently than the 
other circuit courts and held that reckless assault could constitute an act 
of domestic violence.47 The court also refused to consider Voisine and 
Armstrong’s Second Amendment arguments, maintaining that the issue 
38. United States v. Armstrong, 706 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). 
39. Id.
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 8. 
46. Armstrong v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014). 
47. United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 183 (1st Cir. 2015) (“We see no reasoned argument 
that offensive physical contact does not similarly entail the use of force simply because it is inflicted 
recklessly as opposed to intentionally.”). 
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was foreclosed upon by Booker, in which the court “denied an identical 
argument framed as a facial challenge.”48 This was despite the fact that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Castleman had cast doubt on the First 
Circuit’s holding in Booker, suggesting that the court should have 
revisited these standards.49 
After the First Circuit upheld both convictions,50 the Supreme Court 
once again granted the petitioners’ joint motion for certiorari.51 The 
question remained, even after Castleman, whether a misdemeanor assault 
conviction for reckless conduct should result in a lifetime firearm ban. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision to Uphold the Firearms Ban on 
Individuals Convicted of Reckless Crimes of Domestic Violence 
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, began by explaining that 
when an individual commits an assault recklessly, he or she takes an 
action with a certain mens rea to “‘consciously disregard’ a substantial 
risk that the conduct will cause harm to another.”52 After evaluating the 
statutory text and background of § 922(g)(9), the majority concluded that 
a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” under the Lautenberg Amendment.53 The Court reasoned that 
Congress defined the phrase “misdemeanor crime” to include acts that 
involve the use of physical force, and there was no distinction between 
reckless, knowing, or intentional acts in that regard.54 The majority also 
48. Id. at 179 (internal citations omitted). 
49. See id. at 199 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough [the recklessness] argument was
previously foreclosed by our holding in Booker, ‘the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Castleman 
casts doubt upon this holding.’ In support of that assertion, we cited the Supreme Court’s statements 
that ‘the merely reckless causation of bodily injury under [the Tennessee assault statute] may not be 
a “use” of force,’ and that ‘the Courts of Appeals have almost uniformly held that recklessness is not 
sufficient’ to ‘constitute a “use” of force.’ Although Castleman had not directly overruled our prior 
decision in Booker, we noted that these statements from the Supreme Court provided a ‘sound reason’ 
for thinking that the Booker panel might well ‘change its collective mind’ in light of Castleman.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
50. Id. at 177 (“As we see it, this case turns on the unique nature of § 922(g)(9). That section
is meant to ensure that individuals who engage in the ‘seemingly minor act[s]’ that actually constitute 
domestic violence, like squeezing and shoving, may not possess a firearm. This range of predicate 
acts is broader than that found in other federal prohibitions involving the use of physical force. 
Applying the teachings of Castleman, we find that Maine’s definition of reckless assault fits within § 
922(g)(9). We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment and information here. That 
means the conditional guilty pleas the defendants entered are valid and their sentences stand. The 
question is close and we rule narrowly.” (internal citations omitted)). 
51. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 386 (2015), cert. granted. 
52. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278 (2016) (internal citations omitted).
53. See id. 
54. Id. 
10
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relied heavily on the dictionary definition of the word “use,” which is 
defined as the “act of employing something.”55 Justice Kagan stated that 
although the act must be volitional, the word “use” does not require the 
person applying force to have “practical certainty” that it would cause 
harm, only that it would be “substantially likely to do so.”56 Accordingly, 
the Court found that a person who recklessly uses force to cause harm in 
effect carries out the same action as a person who commits an action 
knowingly or intentionally.57 
The Court also considered the legislative history and determined that 
Congress enacted § 922(g)(9) to ban “garden-variety” domestic assault 
misdemeanants from possessing guns.58 Based upon this finding, the 
majority concluded that “Congress must have known it was sweeping in 
some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct.”59 The Court was 
also troubled by the fact that 34 states and the District of Columbia defined 
misdemeanor offenses to include reckless acts, and found that excluding 
reckless behavior would jeopardize § 922(g)(9)’s force in those 
jurisdictions.60 The majority did not comment on the Second Amendment 
issues, as the Court had not agreed to hear that aspect of the defendants’ 
claims. The judgments were then affirmed in favor of the government.61 
C. The Dissenting Opinion Raising Questions of Interpretation and 
Constitutionality 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas, who was joined by Justice Sotomayor, 
argued that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that § 
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) required the use of physical force to be intentional, and 
not merely reckless.62 As such, reckless actions would likely not qualify 
55. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2806 (2d ed. 1954) (“[a]ct of employing
anything”); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2097 (2d ed. 1987) (“act of 
employing, using, or putting into service”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990) (“[a]ct 
of employing,” “application”)).  
56. Id. at 2278-79.
57. Id. at 2280 (“In sum, Congress’s definition of a ‘misdemeanor crime of violence’ contains 
no exclusion for convictions based on reckless behavior. A person who assaults another recklessly 
‘use[s]’ force, no less than one who carries out that same action knowingly or intentionally. The 
relevant text thus supports prohibiting petitioners, and others with similar criminal records, from 
possessing firearms.”). 
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2282. 
62. Id. at 2283-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“First, the word ‘use’ in that provision is best read 
to require intentional conduct. Second, especially in a legal context, ‘force’ generally connotes the 
use of violence against another. Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, defines ‘force’ to mean 
11
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as misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence under the assault statute, and 
thus should not have resulted in firearm prohibitions for the petitioners.63 
The dissent also looked at three different categories of conduct that 
could be considered forceful. First, “a person may intentionally create and 
use . . . force against an object.” Second, “a person may intentionally 
create force, but recklessly apply that force against an object.” And third, 
“a person could recklessly create force that results in damage, even if it 
would not be intended.”64 Though the dissenting Justices agreed that the 
first two categories would be enough to trigger the lifetime firearms 
prohibition under § 922(g)(9), they did not believe that the third category 
should result in such a ban.65 
Most significantly, the dissent found that the term “use of physical 
force” “does not include nonviolent, reckless acts that cause physical 
injury or an offensive touching.”66 Rather, the majority failed to make its 
claim on a variety of other grounds, such as neglecting to explain the 
difference between recklessness in creating force and recklessness in 
causing harm. Instead, the majority created additional conditions, such as 
requiring the conduct to be volitional and not merely accidental.67 The 
dissent argued that the majority’s use of “‘volitional’ [wa]s inconsistent 
with its traditional legal definition,”68 and that an accident may in fact still 
be an accident even if the person responsible acted in a reckless manner.69 
In short, if Congress had meant to incorporate reckless actions under § 
922(g)(9), it would have written the statute with different language so as 
to explicitly include such acts.70 
‘[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing.’ Third, context confirms that ‘use 
of physical force’ connotes an intentional act. Section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s prohibitions also include 
‘the threatened use of a deadly weapon.’” (internal citations omitted)).  
63. Id. at 2284. 
64. Id. at 2285. 
65. Id. (“[We] part ways with the majority’s conclusion that purely reckless conduct—
meaning, where a person recklessly creates force—constitutes a ‘use of physical force.’”). 
66. Id. at 2287. 
67. Id. at 2288-89 (“The majority blurs the distinction between recklessness and intentional
wrongdoing by overlooking the difference between the mens rea for force and the mens rea for 
causing harm with that force. But the majority fails to explain why mere recklessness in creating 
force—as opposed to recklessness in causing harm with intentional force—is sufficient. To limit its 
definition of ‘use,’ the majority adds two additional requirements. The conduct must be ‘volitional,’ 
and it cannot be merely ‘accident[al].’”).  
68. Id. at 2289. 
69. Id. at 2290 (“An accident can mean that someone was blameless—for example, a driver
who accidentally strikes a deer that darts into a roadway. But an accident can also refer to the fact that 
the result was unintended: A car accident is no less an ‘accident’ just because a driver acted 
negligently or recklessly. Neither labeling an act ‘volitional’ nor labeling it a mere ‘accident’ will rein 
in the majority’s overly broad understanding of a ‘use of physical force’”). 
70. Id. (“If Congress wanted to sweep in all reckless conduct, it could have written §
12
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Although this is where Justice Sotomayor’s dissent ended, Justice 
Thomas continued on to argue that the Lautenberg Amendment is already 
too broad, and that the majority’s holding extended the statute into 
unconstitutional territory.71 He argued that “a law that broadly frustrates 
an individual’s right to keep and bear arms must target individuals who 
are beyond the scope of the ‘People’ protected by the Second 
Amendment.”72 In enacting the Lautenberg Amendment, Congress was 
worried about dangerous abusers and the safety of battered women and 
children.73 Individuals who cause minor injury through reckless or 
accidental conduct are not those “People.”74 
Justice Thomas contended that the Lautenberg Amendment does 
more than “close a dangerous loophole” by prohibiting individuals that 
commit reckless acts of domestic violence from possessing firearms;75 it 
also imposes a lifetime ban on firearms possession for summary offenses 
and minor transgressions.76 Justice Thomas concluded by stating that, 
“[w]e treat no other constitutional right so cavalierly. At oral argument, 
the Government could not identify any other fundamental constitutional 
right that a person could lose forever by a single conviction of an 
infraction punishable by a fine.”77 Accordingly, though the Second 
Amendment argument was not heard by the Court, the constitutional 
implications were certainly present and did not escape the attention of all 
the Justices. 
921(a)(33)(A)(ii) in different language. Congress might have prohibited the possession of firearms by 
anyone convicted under a state law prohibiting assault or battery. Congress could also have used 
language tracking the Model Penal Code by saying that a conviction must have, as an element, ‘the 
intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of physical injury.’ But Congress instead defined a 
‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ by requiring that the offense have ‘the use of physical 
force.’ And a ‘use of physical force’ has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts 
designed to cause harm.”). 
71. Id. (“Section 922(g)(9) is already very broad. It imposes a lifetime ban on gun ownership
for a single intentional nonconsensual touching of a family member. A mother who slaps her 18-year-
old son for talking back to her—an intentional use of force—could lose her right to bear arms forever 
if she is cited by the police under a local ordinance. The majority seeks to expand that already broad 
rule to any reckless physical injury or nonconsensual touch. I would not extend the statute into that 
constitutionally problematic territory.”). 
72. Id. at 2291.
73. Id. at 2292. 
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2291. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
13
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IV. THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT AND ITS MISAPPLICATION IN
VOISINE 
When the bill, later codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), was originally 
introduced by Senator Lautenberg, it called for any individual charged 
with a misdemeanor “crime involving domestic violence” to be 
permanently banned from possessing firearms.78 However, Senator 
Lautenberg made numerous concessions to opponents of the proposed 
legislation to gain the support and approval of the Senate. Specifically, he 
yielded to the Republican Senators’ insistence on removing language that 
created a firearms ban based solely on an indictment for a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence.79 Additionally, when the revised bill was 
submitted to the House of Representatives for consideration, the proposed 
language that the misdemeanant be charged with a “crime of violence” 
against a domestic relation was amended to a “use of force” requirement.80 
Many in the House argued that the original language was too broad, and 
needed to be tailored toward forceful, violent abusers.81 
Thus, the statutory ban on firearms possession was not intended to 
extend to individuals charged with minor misdemeanor acts of domestic 
violence.82 Senator Lautenberg himself referred to the targeted group as 
“wife beaters and child abusers.”83 As Justice Thomas explained: 
In enacting § 922(g)(9), Congress was not worried about a husband 
dropping a plate on his wife’s foot or a parent injuring her child by 
texting while driving. Congress was worried that family members were 
abusing other family members through acts of violence and keeping 
their guns by pleading down to misdemeanors. Prohibiting those 
convicted of intentional and knowing batteries from possessing guns—
78. See Tom Lininger, An Ethical Duty to Charge Batterers Appropriately, 22 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 173, 177-78 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
79. See id. at 179 (internal citations omitted).
80. See id. (“‘[S]ome argued that the term “crime of violence” was too broad, and could be
interpreted to include an act such as cutting up a credit card with a pair of scissors. Although this 
concern seemed far-fetched to me, I did agree to a new definition.’” (internal citations omitted)).   
81. See id.
82. See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2014) (“[S]everal Senators argued 
that the provision would help to prevent gun violence by perpetrators of severe domestic abuse. 
Senator Lautenberg referred to ‘serious spousal or child abuse’ and to ‘violent individuals’; Senator 
Hutchison to ‘people who batter their wives’; Senator Wellstone to people who ‘brutalize’ their wives 
or children; and Senator Feinstein to ‘severe and recurring domestic violence.’” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
83. See 142 CONG. REC. S9458 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996), (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
(“There is no reason why wife beaters and child abusers should have guns, and only the most progun 
extremists could possibly disagree with that.”).  
14
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but not those convicted of reckless batteries—amply carries out 
Congress’ objective.84 
Therefore, arguably, Congress approved the specific language with the 
narrow goal of keeping guns out of the hands of those convicted of more 
serious crimes of domestic violence. It simply does not follow that the 
Amendment was aimed toward relatively minor acts causing little or no 
physical harm, which in reality constitute the majority of domestic 
assaults.85 
Additionally, since the Lautenberg Amendment was enacted, there 
have been various attacks on the constitutionality and vagueness of the 
statute.86 Not only has the Amendment been challenged by both law 
enforcement and the military,87 but shortly after enactment, lawsuits 
began to arise from individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes of 
domestic violence questioning whether the Amendment violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.88 Other groups have also expressed 
84. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
85. See Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1411-12 (“[M]ost physical assaults committed against women
and men by intimates are relatively minor and consist of pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, and 
hitting.” (internal citations omitted)).  
86. See James Lockhart, Validity, Construction, And Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9),
Prohibiting Possession of Firearm by Persons Convicted Of Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic 
Violence, 50 A.L.R. Fed.2d 31, 2 (“A large number of cases have dealt with the question of the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and while it has been upheld against challenges under or 
related to the Commerce Clause, claims of unconstitutional vagueness including so-called ‘Lambert 
exception’ claims, alleged violation of principles of equal protection or equal treatment, and alleged 
violation of state rights under the 10th Amendment, and has also been held constitutional insofar as 
it applies to misdemeanors committed prior to its enactment, courts have raised some question as to 
its constitutionality in light of Second Amendment protections, holding in some cases that it 
represents a permissible limitation on possession of firearms, similar to that imposed on felons or the 
mentally ill, but in other cases questioning its Second Amendment validity.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
87. See Ashley G. Pressler, Guns and Intimate Violence: A Constitutional Analysis of The
Lautenberg Amendment, 13 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 705, 706-07 (1999) (“Law enforcement officials 
and members of the military have questioned the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment on 
several levels. Initially, they assert that the new federal law violates the Equal Protection Clause on 
three grounds: (1) it unfairly applies to domestic violence misdemeanants as opposed to other 
misdemeanor crimes; (2) it applies only to domestic violence misdemeanors and not to felonies; and 
(3) it singles out law enforcement officials, specifically, as a particular class of individuals. Secondly, 
they suggest that the Amendment exceeds Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Thirdly, 
the Amendment is criticized as being retroactive and thus violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
Finally, the Amendment is said to constitute a bill of attainder by virtue of its ability to inflict 
punishment.”). 
88. E.g., United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (D. Kan. 1997) (arguing that the
Lautenberg Amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 
67 (D. Mass. 1997); Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1997), 
aff’d, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp.2d 811, 814 (S.D. 
Ind. 1998) (challenging the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment, including arguments that 
15
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frustration with the effectiveness of the Amendment. Though many 
groups supported the notion that domestic violence was a serious problem 
in this country and that legislation was needed to mitigate that violence, 
the language of the Amendment was unclear, the application varied from 
state to state, and as a result, the legislation was not keeping guns out of 
the hands of violent abusers.89 
One reason that the Lautenberg Amendment was ineffective was 
because the courts struggled with the phrase “use of physical force” as it 
related to “domestic violence,” and therefore had trouble determining the 
appropriate standard for triggering the lifetime firearms ban. The Court in 
Castleman took a drastic turn in interpreting the standard for “physical 
force” by applying it to mere “offensive touching.”90 This decision 
essentially contradicted the Court’s earlier holding in Johnson v. United 
States, made just four years earlier.91 In Castleman, the Court found that 
the ban would apply even to those convicted of nonviolent acts of 
domestic violence.92 Yet, as Justice Scalia argued in his concurring 
opinion, this application resulted in an inconsistent interpretation of the 
phrase, which produced an “absurd result.”93 He pointed out the irony that 
someone could be charged with a crime of “domestic violence” when they 
lacked the “violence” component.94 Textually, Justice Scalia argued, the 
majority’s interpretation simply did not make sense, and also went against 
the common meaning of the term “domestic violence” at the time the 
Amendment was enacted.95 
the Ex Post Facto Clause had been violated). 
89. See Lininger, supra note 78, at 175 (“Advocates seeking to enhance its effectiveness have 
focused on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Lautenberg Amendment, and have claimed that 
the lack of clarity in the interpretation of the statute has hindered its application.”). 
90. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410. 
91. See Wesley M. Oliver, Domestic Violence, Gun Possession, And the Importance of
Context, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 36 (2015) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion this term in United States v. 
Castleman concluded that even a misdemeanor involving only an ‘offensive touching’ was sufficient 
to trigger the prohibition. Viewed entirely through the lens of the statute, this result is particularly 
surprising. Just four years ago, the Supreme Court interpreted another provision of this same statute 
and concluded that something more than a mere unwanted touching was required to satisfy the 
requirement of ‘physical force.’” (referencing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 139 (2010))). 
92. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1407. 
93. Id. at 1420 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court seeks to evade Johnson and Leocal on the 
ground that ‘domestic violence’ encompasses a range of force broader than that which constitutes 
“violence” simpliciter.’ That is to say, an act need not be violent to qualify as ‘domestic violence.’ 
That absurdity is not only at war with the English language, it is flatly inconsistent with definitions 
of ‘domestic violence’ from the period surrounding § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s enactment.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
94. Id.
95. Id.
16
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Indeed, it has been argued that the Court failed to adhere to the basic 
canons of construction in Castleman.96 One possible explanation is that 
although the Court’s “conclusion strains the ordinary meaning of the 
language, [it] is quite consistent with a long tradition in criminal cases that 
favors a pro-government interpretation of a statute when the public 
welfare is at stake.”97 But even if such an argument is correct, the 
Lautenberg Amendment was only ratified in a narrow context, meant to 
limit the gun ban to violent offenders that would likely commit a 
subsequent act of domestic violence using a firearm.98 There seems to be 
no strong argument derived from the text or legislative history that could 
support the Court’s broad application of the term “use of physical force.”99 
Perhaps the most detrimental result of Castleman is that it extended 
the scope of the Lautenberg Amendment, while also leaving the door open 
for the term “recklessness” to trigger the federal gun ban.100 The dicta in 
the Castleman decision did, however, offer some guidance by 
acknowledging that the majority of the federal appellate courts did not 
define the term “use . . . of physical force” as including reckless 
conduct.101 
A. The Recklessness Standard Prior to Voisine 
Prior to Voisine, the courts generally found that Congress had 
sufficiently narrowed the scope of § 922(g)(9) to only include offenders 
that posed a probable risk of committing future acts of domestic 
violence.102 Thus, the courts found that § 922(g)(9) was narrowly tailored 
and presumptively lawful.103 Yet, there is reason to believe that reckless 
misdemeanants were not intended to fall under this narrow scope. 
First, as noted in Section II, the majority of the circuit courts and 
many lower courts held that acts of reckless assault do not constitute 
96. See Oliver, supra note 91, at 39 (“If the work of the Court in Castleman is judged by its
adherence to canons of statutory interpretation, the opinion may come up lacking.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
97. Id. at 36. 
98. See Lininger, supra note 78, at 180 (“The Republican negotiators proposed, and Senator
Lautenberg accepted, a version of the use-of-force requirement that was more restrictive than the 
typical definition in the federal gun laws.”). 
99. See Oliver, supra note 91, at 39. 
 100.  See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2274 (2016) (“In Castleman, this Court held 
that a knowing or intentional assault qualifies as such a crime, but left open whether the same was 
true of a reckless assault.”). 
101.  See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, n.8 (2014).  
102.  United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1235 (D. Utah 2009). 
103.  Id. 
17
Menta: The Misapplication of the Lautenberg Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
206 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:189 
“crimes of violence.”104 Additionally, the term “recklessness” is not 
defined uniformly from state to state.105 This lack of uniformity presents 
an issue because the Lautenberg Amendment is typically applied using 
state law, meaning that different forms of conduct can have different 
results depending on the jurisdiction in which they occur. 
For example, in United States v. Booker, the First Circuit found that 
under Maine law, “an offense with a mens rea of recklessness may qualify 
as a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ under § 922(g)(9).”106 
Yet, “Booker is out of step with the other circuit courts, all of which have 
held that recklessness is not sufficient to constitute a ‘use of force’” under 
various other states’ criminal provisions.107 For example, the Ninth 
Circuit held that crimes involving the reckless use of force could not be 
considered “crimes of violence.”108 The Tenth Circuit agreed with this 
position, holding that “recklessness” should be considered accidental 
conduct, which would fail to satisfy the “use of physical force” 
requirement under various definitions of the phrase “crime of 
violence.”109 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit found that “it is possible 
for a defendant to commit an offense ‘intentionally,’ ‘knowingly,’ or 
‘recklessly,’ and though the first two mental states may satisfy the ‘use of 
physical force’ requirement, the third does not.”110 
Notably, with the exception of the First Circuit, the circuit courts 
have overwhelmingly found that reckless conduct was insufficient to be 
considered an act of violence. Considering the weight of the jurisprudence 
prior to the decision in Voisine, even the Maine District Court found that 
the law was not likely to include reckless acts of violence.111 It is therefore 
104.  United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 216 (1st Cir. 2015) (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
 105.  See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 555 F. Supp. 2d 218, 225 (D. Me. 2008) (“In addition, 
considering the state statute, Maine’s definition of ‘recklessly’ is identical to some, but not all, 
definitions of ‘recklessly.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
106.  United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2011). 
107.  United States v. Sales, No. 2:13-cr-137-NT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94187, at *9 (D. Me. 
July 11, 2014). 
108.  See United States v. Nobriga, 474 F.3d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
109.  See United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008). 
110.  United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). 
111.  Sales, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94187, at *14-15 (“The Government contends that the First 
Circuit has not overturned Booker and that this Court cannot reach a conclusion contrary to Booker’s 
holding that reckless conduct is a ‘use of force’ for purposes of § 922(g)(9). As the Government points 
out, ‘[u]ntil a court of appeals revokes a binding precedent, a district court within the circuit is hard 
put to ignore that precedent unless it has been cast into disrepute by supervening authority.’ But as 
both Judges Woodcock and Singal have determined, the lower courts ‘cannot ignore the guidance of 
the Supreme Court and the First Circuit in Castleman, Armstrong and Carter.’ While ‘[r]eading 
Supreme Court tea leaves is chancy,’ it is hard to miss the message here. Upon closer scrutiny, the 
First Circuit may decide that recklessness is sufficient in the § 922(g)(9) context, but given the writing 
18
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somewhat puzzling that both the First Circuit and Supreme Court found 
differently in Voisine. One reason for this may have been that most of the 
circuit court opinions referenced a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16, which 
defines “crimes of violence,” and contains language similar to the “use of 
force” requirement found in § 922(g)(9).112 The First Circuit and Supreme 
Court stated that in their view, “§ 922(g)(9)’s unique context suggested 
that it should be interpreted more broadly than other provisions, including 
§ 16.”113 However, such an interpretation directly contradicts the
legislative history of § 922(g)(9), in which House Representatives argued 
that the term “crime of violence” was overly broad and, consequently, 
wanted to narrow the scope of its meaning.114 
To get over this hurdle, the First Circuit and Supreme Court focused 
on different language, implying that because “domestic violence,” as used 
in § 922(g)(9), is a “term of art,” it should be construed more broadly than 
§ 16.115 It is true that the most significant difference between the
provisions is the inclusion of the term “domestic relation” in § 922(g)(9). 
Yet the courts do not explain why it would be a crime of violence to 
recklessly cause injury to a domestic relation, but that same reckless act 
directed toward a stranger under § 16 would not be considered violent. 
Rather, the court offers only that a “‘squeeze of the arm [that] causes a 
bruise’ is ‘hard to describe as . . . “violence”’ within the meaning of § 16, 
but ‘easy to describe as “domestic violence”’ within the meaning of § 
922(g)(9).”116 
on the wall in Carter, it would be presumptuous for this Court to make that determination.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 112.  See 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2017) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means—(a) an offense that has 
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.”). 
 113.  United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Considering context, section 
16(a) is not analogous to the section which concerns us, § 922(g)(9). To begin, § 16(a) prohibits ‘use 
of physical force against the person or property of another,’ language crucial to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Leocal but absent from the definition at issue here. Castleman itself distinguished the term 
‘use of force’ in § 16(a), a provision for undifferentiated violent crimes, from the term ‘use of physical 
force’ in § 922(g)(9)’s domestic violence provision.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 114.  See 142 Cong. Rec. S11872 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) 
(“Some argued that the term ‘crime of violence’ was too broad . . . .”).  
 115.  Voisine, 778 F.3d at 181 (“Domestic violence is a ‘term of art’ that ‘encompasses a range 
of force broader than that which constitutes “violence” simpliciter,’ including ‘acts that might not 
constitute “violence” in a nondomestic context.’ A ‘crime of violence,’ by contrast, ‘suggests a 
category of violent, active crimes.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
116.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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As Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Castleman, “[t]hat 
absurdity is not only at war with the English language, it is flatly 
inconsistent with definitions of ‘domestic violence’ from the period 
surrounding § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s enactment.”117 He then gave further 
strength to the argument that it was inadequate to distinguish “violence” 
from “domestic violence” in such a rudimentary way by providing that: 
The Court’s inventive, nonviolent definition fares no better when judged 
against other accepted sources of meaning. Current dictionaries give 
“domestic violence” the same meaning as above: ordinary violence that 
occurs in a domestic context. The same goes for definitions of “domestic 
violence” found in other federal statutes. Indeed, Congress defined 
“crime of domestic violence” as a “crime of violence” in another section 
of the same bill that enacted § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).118 
Justice Scalia continued on to state that the Court ignored these facts, and 
instead based its decision on amicus briefs filed by private interest 
groups.119 The problem with that, as he pointed out, is that “when they 
(and the Court) impose their all-embracing definition on the rest of us, 
they not only distort the law, they impoverish the language.”120 
Significantly, Justice Scalia was not alone in this argument. In 
Voisine, the First Circuit’s Judge Torruella also argued that he “agree[d] 
with [the court’s] sister circuits that the ‘use . . . of physical force’ for a 
‘crime of violence’ requires the intentional, and not merely reckless, 
employment of physical force.”121 Judge Torruella’s comment not only 
implies that he thought the First Circuit erred in its conclusion, but that 
the other circuit courts’ holdings regarding the recklessness standard, 
though citing § 16, should apply to reckless acts of domestic violence as 
well. 
In Voisine, Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor used a similar 
rationale, providing that “the term [use of physical force] does not include 
nonviolent, reckless acts that cause physical injury or an offensive 
touching.”122 Therefore, they argued that the majority’s definition was 
overly broad.123 As such, there is a strong argument that the Court 
needlessly deviated from the overwhelming precedent in holding that 
reckless conduct should be considered a “crime of violence.” 
117.  United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1409, 1420 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
118.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
119.  See id. at 1420-21. 
120.  Id. at 1421. 
121.  Voisine, 778 F.3d at 216 (Torruella, J., dissenting).  
122.  Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2287 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
123.  See id. (Thomas., J., dissenting).  
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B. The Court’s Focus on the Lautenberg Amendment’s Underlying 
Policy 
As mentioned above, despite the overwhelming weight of 
jurisprudence excluding reckless behavior from being considered a “crime 
of violence,” the Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit and found 
that a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence under § 922(g)(9).124 The Court claimed to have arrived 
at this decision by dissecting the statutory text and taking into account the 
legislative history of the Amendment.125 However, “[t]his [was] obviously 
not the correct reading of § 922(g)(9). The ‘use of physical force’ does 
not include crimes involving purely reckless conduct.”126 
The majority only provided minimal support for its position and 
ignored the equal, if not more substantial, interpretations cutting the other 
way. First, though not necessarily binding on the Court, “many federal 
jurisdictions [did] not define ‘use . . . of physical force’ as including 
reckless conduct.”127 Additionally, the Court’s conclusion blurs the line 
between intentional and reckless conduct; a person who acts recklessly 
does not always intend to use physical force against another.128 
The majority also failed to distinguish between conduct intended to 
cause harm and conduct not intend to cause harm. There is, in fact, a 
“fundamental difference between conduct that is intentional and reckless 
wrongdoing.”129 In short, an intentional wrong is meant to cause harm and 
a reckless wrong is not.130 Perhaps most importantly, if Congress had 
wanted the Lautenberg Amendment to include those convicted of reckless 
acts of domestic violence, they could have easily incorporated that 
language into the text of § 922(g)(9). However, Congress initially elected 
not to do so and has never amended the language.131 
124.  Id. at 2278. 
125.  See id. at 2275. 
126.  Id. at 2292 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
127.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 25, Armstrong v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (No. 
14-10154), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 747 (2016) (No. 14-10154). 
 128.  See Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2287 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority blurs the distinction 
between recklessness and intentional wrongdoing by overlooking the difference between the mens 
rea for force and the mens rea for causing harm with that force.”). 
129.  Id. at 2288 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 130.  See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“An intentional wrong is designed to inflict harm. A 
reckless wrong is not: ‘While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not 
intend to cause the harm which results from it.’”). 
131.  See id. at 2290 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If Congress wanted to sweep in all reckless 
conduct, it could have written § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) in different language.”). 
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Another plausible reason for the Court’s interpretation was that in 
wake of the Castleman decision, the Court simply gave the language a 
broad reach in order to meet the underlying public welfare goals of the 
Amendment.132 In fact, “[c]ourts often face ambiguous language . . . and 
conclude that strong public policy, designed to protect the welfare of 
citizens, permits a broad view of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity 
notwithstanding. Often courts will not even acknowledge the tension 
between the statutory language and the strong public policy.”133 Yet in 
Voisine, even First Circuit Judge Torruella, who himself is a strong 
supporter of the Lautenberg Amendment, “urged his panel colleagues to 
lay aside their personal views on ‘domestic violence’ and ‘gun violence,’ 
and to do their duty as judges: to say what the law actually is, not what 
they might wish it to be.”134 
The First Circuit and the Supreme Court went against the urgings of 
Judge Torruella, and while it is true that occasionally the law “punishes 
relatively minor acts that themselves are not harmful but may ripen into 
something dangerous,”135 this ruling goes against the overall intention of 
the Lautenberg Amendment. Indeed, the policy of the Amendment did not 
extend to those convicted of potentially minor, reckless acts, as there is 
nothing to suggest that they would be more likely to commit future acts 
of violence using firearms.136 Additionally, the enforcement of a law 
relating to minor conduct should never result in the loss of a fundamental 
constitutional right; such losses are reserved for conduct which rises to a 
much higher level of culpability. 
V. SECOND AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENT 
It is not surprising that since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller 
and McDonald, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9)’s Second Amendment 
132.  See Oliver, supra note 91, at 38-39. 
133.  Oliver, supra note 91, at 39. 
134.  Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners Foundation, Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun 
Owners of California, U.S. Justice Foundation, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and 
Institute on the Constitution in Support of Petitioners at 2, Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 
(2016). 
135.  Oliver, supra note 91, at 38 (internal citations omitted).  
 136.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 22, Armstrong v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) 
(No. 14-10154), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 747 (2016) (No. 14-10154) (“Voisine . . . was 
misplaced both as a policy matter and legally. The government offers no response to this criticism . . 
. . Instead, it attempts a misdirection, noting that this Court ‘considered and rejected the view “that 
Congress meant to narrow the scope of the statute to convictions based on especially severe conduct.”’ 
That argument misses the mark, because an interpretation of § 922(g)(9) that includes all reckless 
misdemeanors will include many such misdemeanors that do not ‘subject one intimate partner to the 
other’s control’ in any meaningful way.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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restrictions has been challenged.137 Complicating this issue is the fact that 
the courts have lacked uniformity regarding the level of scrutiny used for 
this constitutional analysis.138 For example, while discussing the proper 
level of constitutional scrutiny, the Sixth Circuit initially stated that 
“[a]lthough it is true that strict scrutiny is not always implicated when a 
fundamental right is at stake, the Supreme Court has suggested that there 
is a presumption in favor of strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is 
involved.”139 However, the court subsequently stated that when it came to 
§ 922(g)(9), the circuit courts that heard this issue had applied
intermediate scrutiny, and therefore, it opted to follow suit,140 despite the 
fact that a fundamental right was implicated. 
In general, the courts have tried to limit the Lautenberg 
Amendment’s constitutional implications altogether by finding that those 
convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors are not entitled to the 
Second Amendment protections discussed in Heller.141 The courts have 
stated that domestic violence cases “fall outside the specific exceptions in 
 137.  E.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Booker, 644 
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 
628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); and United States 
v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d
678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In the wake of Heller, the federal courts of appeals have heard numerous 
constitutional challenges to the various prohibitions enumerated in § 922(g).”). 
 138.  See Fisher v. Kealoha, 49 F. Supp. 3d 727, 742-43 (D. Haw. 2014) (“[T]he Chovan court 
concluded that the Lautenberg Amendment ‘does not implicate the core Second Amendment right, 
but it does place a substantial burden on the right.’ As such, the Court determined that intermediate 
rather than strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply when addressing § 922(g)(9)’s 
constitutionality. Chovan defined the intermediate scrutiny standard as requiring that ‘(1) the 
government’s stated objective be significant, substantial, or important; and (2) a reasonable fit 
between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective.’ Applying this standard, the court 
reasoned that § 922(g)(9) served an important government interest in preventing domestic gun 
violence.” (internal citations omitted)); Lockhart, supra note 86, at 9 (discussing Fraternal Order of 
Police v. U.S., 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Lockhart explained that though the Court decided 
Fraternal Order of Police before Heller and McDonald, the decision was important because the court 
claimed that “18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9) did not infringe a fundamental right, so the classification of 
domestic violence misdemeanants versus felons had to be upheld if there was any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. This view has been 
rendered questionable by recent Second Amendment analysis . . . suggesting that the statute is subject 
to a higher level of scrutiny.” Id.; see also United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1228 (D. 
Utah 2009) (applying strict scrutiny analysis, requiring the government to show that § 922(g)(9) was 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest). 
 139.  Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 327 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
strict scrutiny applies to “fundamental” liberty interests (internal citations omitted)), rev’d 837 F.3d 
at 691-92 (6th Cir. 2016). 
140.  See Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691-92 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).  
 141.  See Chester, 628 F.3d at 679 (“We see no reason to exclude § 922(g)(9) from the list of 
long-standing prohibitions on which Heller does not cast doubt.”). 
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Heller that warrant independent constitutional scrutiny,”142 and though 
“[l]aws that restrict the right to bear arms are subject to meaningful 
review, unless they severely burden the core Second Amendment right of 
armed defense, strict scrutiny is unwarranted.”143 
Yet, because the Amendment imposes a complete restriction of a 
fundamental right, perhaps a more logical approach would be to first 
consider Heller’s emphasis on core Second Amendment activity, and then 
choose a scrutiny level that is “informed by (1) ‘how close the law comes 
to the core of the Second Amendment right,’ and (2) ‘the severity of the 
law’s burden on the right.’”144 If courts were to adopt this approach and 
adhere to the principles upon which they are supposedly bound, such an 
analysis would bring about the proper result. However, as many courts 
tend to focus more heavily on the underlying policy than on the law’s 
burdening of the fundamental right, they would likely still refrain from 
using strict scrutiny.145 The underlying theory used by these courts is that 
gun violence against domestic abuse victims is a matter of national 
concern and, ultimately, Congress has the authority to legislate in this 
area, even if doing so limits the exercise of a constitutional right.146 
Other courts, particularly within the First Circuit’s jurisdiction, 
seemed to brush off claims of Second Amendment infringement under the 
Lautenberg Amendment by relying solely on precedent. Many of the 
decisions that dealt with Second Amendment claims, rather than 
providing an in-depth analysis of the constitutional implications, simply 
stated that the issue had previously been decided by Booker.147 
For example, in United States v. Carter, the defendant, Wayne 
Carter, was prosecuted for spitting in his girlfriend’s face and shoving her 
on her shoulder.148 The defendant’s girlfriend told officers that she “was 
not hurt, did not want Carter arrested, and did not want to press charges; 
she only wanted him removed from the house.”149 Yet, the prosecutor 
 142.  United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2010), substituted opinion, 628 
F.3d 673, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26508, aff’d, 514 F. App’x 393 (4th Cir. 2013).   
143.  Id. at 398 (internal citations omitted).  
144.  Tyler, 837 F.3d at 690 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).  
145.  See Oliver, supra note 91, at 39. 
146.  See United States v. Pettengill, 682 F. Supp. 2d 49, 57 (D. Me. 2010) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 147.  See United States v. Armstrong, 706 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Carter, 752 
F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2014), rev’d, No. 2:10-cr-00155-GZS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92312 (D. Me. July 8, 
2014), and rev’d, 860 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(holding that § 922(g)(9) was constitutional (internal citations omitted)). 
 148.  See Carter, 752 F.3d at 10, rev’d, No. 2:10-cr-00155-GZS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92312, 
at *19 (D. Me. July 8, 2014), and rev’d, 860 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2017). 
149.  Id. at 10-11.  
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decided to file charges against Carter under the general purpose assault 
statute, and he was ultimately found guilty.150 After subsequently being 
charged with possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(9), Carter argued that 
the Amendment “deprives a significant population of non-violent 
offenders from exercising a core constitutional right protected by the 
Second Amendment.”151 
Carter further maintained that a restriction depriving competent non-
felons of their Second Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling governmental interest. He asserted that “[b]ecause there is no 
reliable information that misdemeanants are likely to misuse firearms at a 
rate any greater than those not convicted of such petty crimes, the law fails 
constitutional muster.”152 Though Carter made several compelling 
arguments, the First Circuit provided little analysis on the issue, failed to 
address the defendant’s individual arguments, and merely stated that the 
issue was foreclosed upon by Booker.153 
Even though § 922(g)(9) was found to be constitutional by the First 
Circuit, other courts still saw problems with the Lautenberg Amendment’s 
impact on the Second Amendment. For example, in United States v. 
Engstrum, after the defendant questioned the constitutionality of the 
Lautenberg Amendment, and even though the district court found that § 
922(g)(9) protected a societal interest,154 the court acknowledged that: 
Not every individual convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor fits 
within the classification described in the legislative history, in that not 
all domestic violence misdemeanants have shown they cannot control 
themselves or are prone to fits of violent rage. However, § 922(g)(9) was 
intended to extend the prohibition on possession to domestic violence 
150.  See id. at 11.  
151.  Id. at 12. 
152.  Id. 
153.  See id. at 13. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Castleman, however, the Carter 
decision was remanded for further consideration and the court granted Carter’s motion to dismiss. 
United States v. Carter, No. 2:10-cr-00155-GZS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92312, at *19 (D. Me. July 
8, 2014), rev’d, 860 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2017). The case was subsequently appealed, and in June 2017, 
the First Circuit, ironically, turned to the Supreme Court’s decision in Voisine in reaching its holding. 
United States v. Carter, 860 F.3d 39, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2017). The court stated that Castleman’s 
prediction that the Lautenberg Amendment would not extend to reckless behavior proved false. 
Carter, 860 F.3d 39, 42. The court concluded that, “notwithstanding Castleman, the reckless form of 
the Maine assault statute is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . [and] [t]he Supreme Court 
affirmed. In so doing, it plainly and finally resolved the uncertain issue of law that has sent this case 
around the barn and back.” Carter, 860 F.3d at 42-43. The First Circuit then reversed the district 
court’s decision and reinstated Carter’s indictment. Id. at 43. 
154.  See United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (D. Utah 2009). 
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misdemeanants in order to assure that those who do pose that sort of risk 
to intimate partners or children would be protected.155 
The court further stated that it found it troubling that the Lautenberg 
Amendment could be used to deprive otherwise law-abiding citizens, who 
pose no prospective risk of violence, of their Second Amendment rights 
as a result of a single past transgression.156 
It should be noted that these cases were decided before either of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Castleman and Voisine. The broadening of 
the term “use of physical force” to include misdemeanor reckless acts 
alone should have been enough for this argument to be revisited by the 
Court. Justice Thomas took advantage of this opportunity during oral 
argument in Voisine and broke his ten-year silence to ask the government 
whether any laws other than the Lautenberg Amendment suspend 
constitutional rights for misdemeanor convictions.157 Notably, but not 
surprisingly, the government could not point to any such laws.158 Justice 
Thomas’ question implies that even though the rest of the Court was 
looking at the statutory interpretation issue, the underlying constitutional 
implications were worth consideration. Perhaps merely stating that they 
were foreclosed upon in Booker was not enough. 
His question highlighted his concerns about Second Amendment 
protections and the fact that, other than the Lautenberg Amendment, there 
is no other federal statute that places such a significant limitation upon a 
constitutionally protected right.159 In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Thomas argued that, “[e]ven assuming any doubt remains over the reading 
of ‘use of physical force,’ the majority errs by reading the statute in a way 
that creates serious constitutional problems.”160 This is because, per the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Supreme Court is expected to 
choose the constitutional reading of a statute when faced with multiple 
interpretations.161 Yet the majority expanded an already broad rule to also 
155.  Id. at 1233-34. 
156.  See id. at 1235. 
157.  See Adam Liptak, Clarence Thomas Breaks 10 Years of Silence at Supreme Court, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/us/politics/supreme-court-
clarence-thomas.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/8Q2C-XT22].  
158.  See id.  
 159.  See id. (“In today’s case, [Justice Thomas] chose to ask a question he obviously thought 
his colleagues hadn’t paid enough attention to: whether the constitutional protections in the Second 
Amendment were being taken seriously enough.”). 
160.  Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2290 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
161.  See id. (internal citations omitted). 
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include any reckless physical injury or nonconsensual touching, which 
thrust the Amendment into “constitutionally problematic territory.”162 
It can also be argued that although the Second Amendment 
enumerates protections for individuals to keep and bear arms, states 
sometimes impose narrow limitations on that right.163 These limitations, 
however, do not generally deny individuals convicted of minor crimes the 
right to bear arms.164 To be considered constitutional, any law that denies 
a person the right to keep and bear arms must be aimed at those individuals 
who are beyond the scope of Second Amendment protection.165 There is 
nothing in the Second Amendment to suggest that individuals convicted 
of reckless misdemeanor acts of domestic violence are beyond that 
scope.166 Yet, the Lautenberg Amendment has been extended so broadly 
as to include “a lifetime ban on gun ownership for a single intentional 
nonconsensual touching of a family member.”167 
Further, as recently as 2010, the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right.168 Though 
some states have, in certain instances, imposed certain limitations on gun 
possession, such as by forbidding individuals from carrying concealed 
weapons, these restrictions “neither prohibit nor broadly frustrate any 
individual from generally exercising his right to bear arms.”169 Yet in 
Voisine, by “construing the statute . . . so expansively so that causing a 
single minor reckless injury or offensive touching can lead someone to 
lose his right to bear arms forever, the Court continues to ‘relegat[e] the 
Second Amendment to a second class right.’”170 
There is no justifiable reason to treat the right to bear arms differently 
than any of the other constitutional amendments.171 For example, none of 
the First Amendment rights, such as freedom of religion, speech, press, 
assembly, and petition, are lost as a result of a person being convicted of 
162.  See id.  
163.  See id.  
164.  See id. at 2291 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
165.  See id. 
166.  See id.  
167.  Id. 
168.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).  
169.  Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2291 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
170.  Id. at 2292 (internal citations omitted).  
171.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners Foundation, Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun 
Owners of California, U.S. Justice Foundation, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and 
Institute on the Constitution in Support of Petitioners at 4, Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 
(2016) (No. 14-10154). 
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a minor crime.172 As both are equal privileges of United States citizenship, 
the same should also be true for the Second Amendment.173 
It could be argued that the Court simply needs to adequately hear and 
consider the Second Amendment issue, as it relates to the Lautenberg 
Amendment, in order to properly address this problem. However, it seems 
unlikely that the Court will do so, given the policy implications and its 
concern regarding the potential nullification of laws in jurisdictions with 
assault statutes extending to recklessness. Therefore, the ambiguous 
language will likely need to be addressed and clarified by Congress.174 
Such action is necessary, as subsequent cases have not only applied the 
holding in Voisine, but have also extended the newly defined recklessness 
standard to other provisions, despite the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
being specific to the Lautenberg Amendment’s language.175 
If Congress narrows the scope of the Amendment by clarifying the 
pertinent terminology, the Court will then be able to apply it to the correct 
group of dangerous abusers—the true targets of the legislation. After all, 
“it is [not] the function of courts to assign criminal responsibility. That is 
the function of Congress. In carrying out the assignment of responsibility 
that Congress has decided upon, courts should be faithful to the language 
that it has chosen to express its will.”176 Once the language is clarified and 
the Court can apply the Lautenberg Amendment correctly, it will then be 
up to the executive branch to maintain the law’s effectiveness through 
consistent and strict enforcement. 
VI. CONCLUSION
“Given that 40% of U.S. households have guns, it is likely that 
hundreds of thousands of convicted domestic violence misdemeanants 
172.  See id. 
173.  See id. 
174.  See Noah Feldman, What Being Reckless Means to Todays Courts, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-29/what-being-reckless-means-
to-today-s-courts [http://perma.cc/27JD-ZERJ] (“But the holding may eventually have broader 
consequences for the interpretation of other federal laws. So it’s worth pausing to ask yourself: Do 
you think the state should be able to criminalize recklessness? If your answer is yes, then you can rest 
easy. If it’s no, you might want to think about writing your representatives in Congress. The courts 
probably aren’t going to do the job for you.”). 
 175.  See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 860 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2017) (reversing the dismissal of 
the defendant’s indictment for possession of a firearm in light of the Voisine decision that reckless 
assault qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence); Kane v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-
00146-MR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176684, at *11 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2016) (holding that the 
Voisine standard applies to the defendant’s conviction under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 2015) 
for recklessly causing bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon). 
176.  United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006).  
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possess firearms.”177 Not only is this statistic evidence that the Lautenberg 
Amendment has been largely ineffective, it may also be indicative of the 
Supreme Court’s underlying motive to extend the Amendment’s reach to 
reckless behavior. However, the reality is that many individuals convicted 
of domestic assault, including those who commit knowing and intentional 
assaults against domestic relations, will likely continue to possess guns 
because the convictions are not regularly reported to the gun-background-
check system. In fact, “[a]s of 2013, Voisine’s home state of Maine had 
not submitted a single domestic-violence record to the federal gun-
background-check system. Neither had 12 other states.”178 Conceivably, 
then, part of the problem is that the legislation continues to lack uniform, 
effective enforcement. 
Whatever the case may be, the shortcomings of the Lautenberg 
Amendment are apparent, and arbitrarily extending an ambiguous law to 
include reckless misdemeanants is not the proper way to mitigate the 
problem. Such an extension of the law does little, if anything, to actually 
help victims of domestic violence. The skewed result is that dangerous 
abusers often retain access to firearms, while at the same time, reckless 
and often nonviolent misdemeanants are prevented from possessing 
firearms. Such a result clearly evidences that the language of § 922(g)(9) 
needs amended and the law needs to be actively enforced. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has established that the right to keep 
and bear arms is a fundamental right,179 and has also provided that, 
“[w]here certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved . . . regulation limiting 
these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’ and that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake.”180 It is, however, difficult to determine 
what compelling state interest is served by subjecting reckless 
misdemeanants to a lifelong firearms ban, particularly for minor incidents 
that may be accidental or punishable by a fine. Rather, it appears that the 
Court merely created an over-inclusive policy that extends beyond the 
clear purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment. 
177.  Lininger, supra note 78, at 176. 
 178.  Olivia Li, The Supreme Court Case That Could Let ‘Lesser’ Domestic Abusers Own Guns, 
THE TRACE (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/02/supreme-court-domestic-abusers-
gun-ownership/ [http://perma.cc/4ZN6-4FSQ].  
179.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).  
180.  E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (internal citations omitted); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460, 463-
64 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
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There is certainly a compelling reason to keep violent abusers, who 
are not law-abiding citizens, and who knowingly and intentionally hurt 
their victims, from owning firearms. However, reckless misdemeanants 
simply do not fall into the same category as those dangerous individuals. 
As such, they should remain among the “people” protected by the Second 
Amendment,181 and the language of § 922(g)(9) should be corrected in 
order to prevent this entire class of citizens from being denied their 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms. 
 181.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners Foundation, Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun 
Owners of California, U.S. Justice Foundation, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and 
Institute on the Constitution in Support of Petitioners at 17, Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 
(2016) (No. 14-10154) (“Unless the government can affirmatively demonstrate that, because of their 
misdemeanor convictions, petitioners may be deprived of a right that would otherwise belong to them 
as citizens of this country, petitioners remain among the ‘people’ protected by the Second 
Amendment.”). 
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